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Abstract. This paper extends the out-of-equilibrium literature to analyse a struc-
tural transition characterized by the emergence of a new sector that satises a want
lower in the hierarchical scale. In particular, the dynamic interaction demand-supply
can be a source of multiple long-run outcomes if both preferences and the technol-
ogy evolve endogenously. It will be shown that a successful transition to a two-sector
economy is ensured by a balanced distribution of innovative rents. Moreover, the full-
employment region lies between two regions of classical and Keynesian unemployment,
in contrast with the standard view of a negative relationship between real wages and
employment. Finally, demand shortages, due to an unbalanced distribution, can bring
about a long-run slump.
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1. Introduction
In recent growth literature, inequality acquired a prominent role as a source of multi-
ple equilibria. By and large, following a supply-side view, multiple equilibria emerge if
the accumulation of human capital is aected either by stringent borrowing constraints
or by political distortions associated to high inequality (Galor and Zeira 1993, Perotti
1996, Benabou 2000). A demand-side channel through which inequality in factor en-
dowments can inuence growth is investigated by modern macroeconomics in the case of
hierarchical needs with satiation limits (Matsuyama 2002, Bertola et al. 2006). Follow-
ing this view, demand constraints can be removed, favouring the emergence of modern
sectors which allow to escape satiation traps. Inequality can have opposite eects on
growth depending on the relative importance attributed to innovations in `existing' or
`new' sectors. On the one hand, lowering inequality increases growth if a critical mass
of consumers is required to trigger innovations that reduce the cost of basic goods and
allow poor households to access goods with low priority (trickle-up). On the other hand,
an increase in inequality benet growth if pioneer consumers enable innovations in the
new sector, making the consumption of new goods aordable to all (trickle-down).
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None of these approaches, however, addresses the issue of the relationship between
structural change and inequality pointing to the role played along the transition process
by the dynamic interaction of supply and demand. This rules out the possibility that
the selection of which nal equilibrium will prevail might depend on the characteris-
tics of the transition process itself (Arthur 1989). A post-Keynesian approach (Kaldor
1957, Kaldor and Mirless 1960, Pasinetti 1981) and, particularly, the assumption of func-
tionally heterogeneous agents{workers mainly consume, while entrepreneurs (or skilled
workers) mainly invest{overcomes the limits of the standard analyses in so far as inequal-
ity changes directly translate into supply-demand unbalances and can generate, through
this channel, multiple outcomes
1.
What we claim in this paper is that, by including the evolution of preferences and
technology in the post-Keynesian framework, the relationship between inequality and
structural change turns out to be critically aected by the diachronic evolution of supply
and demand. The main methodological novelty of our paper is to build a post-Keynesian
model where both workers and entrepreneurs adapt their consumption habits and in-
vestment behaviour. As will be extensively explained in section 2, such an adaptation
process modies the fundamentals of the economy. On the one side, the appearance of
a new want slowly modies workers' habits; on the other side, the sectoral direction of
technical change reects market disequilibria.
Considering multiple outcomes as the result of a `what happens step-by-step along a
way that begins with the breaking of the existing steady state' (Amendola et al. 2001,
p.1){and not as equilibrium congurations associated with dierent initial conditions{
implies rethinking the stark dichotomy between short- and long-run processes that mirror
the one between demand and supply factors. Out-of-Equilibrium sequential models
(Amendola and Gaard 1998, AG 1998 from now) represent a suitable tool for connecting
demand and supply, short- and long-run through a direct focus on the transition process
from a state-of-rest to another. Similarly to Gaard and Saraceno (2008), we extend out-
of-equilibrium models to study structural change in a two-sector economy. Our model,
however, substantially diers from theirs as we endogenize the long-run evolution of
preferences and technology.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that the breaking of the initial steady state
is accompanied by a change in the existing rule governing the assignment of innovative
rents between workers and entrepreneurs. In particular, we will study, by means of
numerical analyses, which distributive change is compatible with a full transition to a
two-sector economy. Note that this assumption is not only historically grounded (e.g.
Polanyi 1944), but is particularly useful also in interpreting recent economic trends.
Indeed, following the advent of ICT technologies, the gains of innovations accrued to a
small fraction of the population, leaving the income of individuals under the 90th income
percentile substantially unchanged and well below the long-run improvements of labour
productivity (e.g. Wol 2006, Lemieux 2008).
1This result is related to the underlying Predator-Prey ecology that characterizes these models (Good-
win 1967), namely: each of the two classes needs the other to survive as long as entrepreneurs' investments
depends on workers' demand whereas wages are paid in advance out of prots and hence depends on
prots through investments.3
The way in which these disparities contribute to and amplify the eect of the current
nancial crisis is still an open issue. Interestingly, our model is able to display a scenario
where the negative eects of a demand shortage, due to a large distributive change in
favour of entrepreneurs, manifest themselves in the long-run. More in general, what
robustly emerges is an inverse U-shaped relationship between distributive changes and
the nal outcome of the transition, in which both output maximization and full employ-
ment are reached at the level of moderate distributive changes. When the distribution of
innovative rents is too much in favour of workers, entrepreneurs' funds required to invest
in incremental innovations tend to zero conjuring a supply constraint to growth and em-
ployment. In the opposite distributive case, the system ends up either in a steady-state
characterized by Keynesian unemployment or in an unviable situation.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides the theoretical background to
our assumptions on the evolution of preferences and technology. Section 3 lays down the
model, while section 4 is devoted to the discussion of the main results. Section 5 analyses
the robustness of our ndings. Section 6 concludes and suggests further applications of
the model.
2. The evolution of preferences and technology
The mechanism of adaptation of preferences and technology constitutes the channel
through which short-run events, such as market disequilibria, turn out to aect long-
run ones. In the rst part of this section, we provide a behavioural justifucation of the
observed logistic patterns that characterize the consumption of most goods (Aoki and
Yoshikawa 2002). In the second part, we sketch the rationale behind innovative choices
driven by market disequilibria and the sectoral complementarity generated through this
channel.
2.1. Habits Formation and Learning. At least since the work of Georgescu-Roegen
1936, the idea that preferences remain xed over time has been questioned. However,
changes in preferences were not extensively investigated until new notions of rationality
provided the background to justify individual learning and non-optimizing behaviour.
Moving from the idea that individuals are rationally bounded, the evolutionary literature
applies the concepts of routine and search to consumption activities (e.g. Metcalfe 2001,
Witt 2001); in this framework, learning takes time and crucially depends on experience
in so far as consumers gradually discover the characteristics of a new good. Moreover,
according to Nelson and Consoli 2009, consumer's behaviour{i.e. habits{are stable to
small changes in the external environment, but are signicantly aected by signicant
novilties such as the appearance of new products or wants.
To the aims of this paper, a simple way to approach the issue of how habits change
following the emergence of a new want is to look at the degree of substitutability between
the old and the new want. If substitutability is perfect and, for simplicity, each good
satises a unique want, all the resources devoted to the old good can be gradually
relocated to the new one. Moreover, this process can be slower or faster according to
the learning eort required to extract the maximum utility out of the new good. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, if the two wants are hierarchically ranked and the old one
is `more essential' than the new, the quota spent in the satisfaction of the existing want
stays xed in face of the emergence of the new one. In this case, agents will start to4
experience the consumption of the new good only if two conditions are jointly satised:
1. consumption of the existing good is at its satiation level, 2. there must be a certain
budget exibility in order to trigger the process of self-reinforcing learning.
The existence of satiation limits is essential to justify states-of-rest where consumers
are endowed with idle funds. When satiation of a given want is reached, consumers
search for a new want whose discovery brings about the formation of a new habit. The
discovery of the new want can be easily modelled as an increase of the willingness-to-pay
above its price (e.g. Wathieu 2004). Once this jump in the willingness-to-pay takes
place, agents begin to consume the new good, hence the `experienced willingness-to-pay'
increases, gradually shaping a new habit. It is easy to show that this simple type of
habituation takes time and displays a typical logistic pattern provided that the budget
constraint is not binding; otherwise, the consumption of the new good eventually aborts.
Put another way, workers' funds, and their evolution through the distributive changes,
represent the critical dynamic constraint to the eective viability of consumers' learning.
To be consistent with post-Keynesian literature (Pasinetti 1981), throughout the pa-
per we will focus on the case in which the new good satises a want hierachically lower
in ranking. This allows us to connect structural change with long-run growth: escaping
satiation is ensured by the on-going emergence of new wants that coexist with old ones
2.
2.2. Structural Change and Demand-Driven Innovations. The other pillar of our
model is the way of conceiving technical change, which is closely related to Pasinetti's
suggestion (1981) that innovations are driven by the existence of expected excesses of
demand. For the purposes of our discussion, it is useful to reiterate the distinction
between hierarchical wants and perfect substitution. In the latter case, excesses of
demand would appear in the new sector to the detriment of the old one. As a result,
innovations will be uniquely concentrated in the new sector, whereas the technology
for the production of the basic good remains the same. In the case of a hierarchical
relationship between wants, overall demand expands since the fresh demand for the new
good is added to the unchanged demand for the old one. The key issue is, therefore,
how the supply-side of the economy adjusts to this expansion. In a paper similar to
ours (Aoki and Yoshikawa 2002), supply matches the increase of demand provided that
growth is not constrained by xed factors of production (i.e. AK model).
A strong implication of the Aoki and Yoshikawa (2002) paper lies in the fact that
technological change is concentrated only in new sectors which enjoy high growth rate
since preferences are assumed to be `logistic-shaped'. This is clearly at odds with histori-
cal experience in so far as technological improvements directed towards backward sectors
appear to be a critical feature of structural change. For instance, the technological
revolution in agriculture was, by and large, the reaction of the process of urbanization
brought about by industrialization (David 1975). In recent times, the application of ICT
to the retailing and other ICT-users' sectors followed the formation of an authonomous
2Note that this view is in contrast with the view of endogenous growth theorists who maintain that the
mere replacement of old sectors and technologies with new ones eventually fuel long-run growth (see Aoki
and Yoshikawa 2002). Note also that, when old and new wants are perfect substitutes, the emergence
of a new want and of a corresponding good/sector is analytically equivalent to the replacement of old a
technology with a new one in the existing sector. Thus, the analysis of this case would be equivalent to
the out-of-equilibrium literature dealing with the eect of technical change (AG 1998).5
ICT sector (e.g. Dew-Becker and Gordon 2008). It is worth to notice also that this
view of innovations driven by sector unbalances is essential to overcome the dichotomy
between trickle-down and trickle-up processes that dominates the current debate on es-
caping satiation (see Bertola et al. 2006). In our model, instead, the appearance of
a new want brings about sectoral unbalances that trigger innovations in both sectors,
which tend to mitigate the sectoral competition over scarce resources.
To give a simple idea of how the dynamic interaction between demand and supply
works in our model, let us start from a system at the satiation level for a given want. In
this state-of-rest, all eorts aimed at enhancing the productivity of the technology used in
the old sector are useless because the demand for this good stagnates, hence investments
in innovation are null. Once a new good is discovered, investments start to be reallocated
to the new sector while learning gradually increases the share of income spent in the new
good. As a result, aggregate demand increases and generates further prot opportunities
in both sectors: in the new one, because learning is self-reinforcing provided that the
workers' budget constraint is not binding; in the old one, because workers, relocated in
the new sector, should be replaced
3. In this situation, entrepreneurs will nd it protable
to invest in innovations aimed at improving the productivity of labour in both sectors.
Overall, the initial disequilibrium due to the discovery of a new market brings about a
self-sustaining interaction of preferences and technology whose success mainly depends
on how the distribution changes.
3. The Model
Our model is grounded in out-of-equilibrium literature (e.g. AG 1998); in particular,
we use three standard elements of out-of-equilibrium models: 1. Adaptive behaviour:
agents adapt current plans to past disequilibria; 2. Intertemporal complementarities:
production takes time and is carried on in vertical integrated rms with xed propor-
tions of capital and labour; 3. Monetary economy: money matters as a cash-in-advance
constraint is assumed. Here, we extend adaptive behaviour to model learning and tech-
nological change.
3.1. Technology. There are two nal goods/sectors (i = 1;2). Each of these goods is
produced in a vertical integrated rm in two stages: the capital good production c and
the nal good production u.
The nal goods are produced by mean of labor and capital with a Leontie technology:
















are respectively the capital and labor productivity in sector i at
time t. The superscript u refers to the labour required in the production of the nal
good.
3For those familiar with the work of Albert Hirshman (1958), it is interesting to stress the similarity
between the mechanism of induced innovation driven by disequilibria in our model and its idea of a
development process driven by the self-reinforcing interaction of sectoral disequilibria.6
In each sector i, capital goods depreciate at a rate , whereas investments become
productive capacity after one gestation lag.
(3.2) Ki




t 1 are the capital goods produced at time t 1. Capital goods are produced













is the labour productivity and the superscript c denotes the production of
physical capital.
The technology changes over time; in particular, as standard in the growth literature
(e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1998) technical progress is a concave function of the past
amount of investments in innovation ei




















with s = u;c and  ; 2 (0;1).
3.2. Entrepreneur Behaviour: production, investments and innovation. At the
beginning of each period, entrepreneurs decide over production, investments and innova-
tion in three stages. First, demand expectations are formed in each sector and available
funds are allocated to carry on current production. Second, the remaining funds, if any,
are invested in each sector to replace or expand the capital stock. Lastly, when desired
investments are constrained by labour scarcity, investments in innovations are carried
on in order to increase labour eciency.
3.2.1. Production decisions. As usual in these models, the expected demand e Xi in sector
i varies according to an adaptive rule:
(3.5) e Xi
t = Xi
t 1 + (1   ) e Xi
t 1
At equilibrium production equals expected demand in real terms and expectations are
fully realized:
(3.6) Si












Out of equilibrium, real stocks oi
t involuntarily accumulated in the previous period
are brought back into the market. If the capital constraint is not binding, production
plus the accumulated real stock oi
t equals the expected demand:
(3.7) Si






Hence, the desired amount of labour required to produce the nal output in each sector





i, which can be lower than the ecient level L
u;i






3.2.2. Investments. The nal market disequilibria also aect investments behaviour.
The variation over time of the fund invested in the production of capital goods F
c;i
t



















where  2 (0;1) measures the degree of investment adjustment to the disequilibrium
at time t   1, which corresponds to the past forecast errorXi
t 1   e Xi







takes into account the eective amount of labour required to carry on
investment per unit of total output, while wt is the wage rate that is also the unitary
investment cost. Obviously, if  = 1, investments fully adjust to disequilibria. As we will
see, the parameter  is critical for our analysis and can be interpreted as the degree of
prudence in expanding the productive capacity and, implicitly, in reallocating resources
to a dierent sector.
Entrepreneurs can be constrained by their initial period funds Ft. Out-of-equilibrium,
this fund could be insucient in nancing the desired level of sectoral production and
investments. In this case, we adopt the standard rule (see AG 1998) that the funds for
investments F
c;i
t are cut rstly. Investments in sector i are reduced proportionally to







, and the desired labour demand for investments







3.2.3. Innovation. On the other end of the spectrum, labour can be the binding factor as
its supply is xed at L. This typically occurs when the excess of demand is so large that
it can not be satised by the existing capacity. Indeed, if in sector i labour demanded
for investments is greater than the labour available after having fullled the requirement
of nal production e L
c;i
t > i(L  
P e L
u;i
t ), the labour used to produce capital goods is
constrained proportionally to the planned share i. The residual fund Ri
t, that comes
out if the labour constraint is binding, is therefore used to improve labour eciency
through innovation. In particular, similarly to Amendola and Vona (2008), the fund
Ri
t is used to pay a retraining program for workers. Likewise, one could interpret Ri
t as
R&D nancing. Given the funds Ri
t, the amount of investments in innovation ei
t depends








t = min(e Li
t;Li) is the labour market outcome. Note that equation 3.4 implies
that, at the beginning of the transition, innovation turns out to be more ecient in the
new sector, that is relatively smaller.
3.3. Demand and Preferences. According to the functional distinction of income
sources, demand comes from workers only. Each worker owns a fund composed by
the accumulated wealth Ht, the aggregate labor income (the wage fund) Wt, and the8
training investments Ri
t. This fund is equivalent to the `potential demand' in value:




The wage fund reads:













The demand for the nal good i at time t is a ratio i of the total fund, depending




3.3.1. Preferences. For sake of simplicity, we keep assuming that each single good sat-
ises only one need. Workers have a reserve demand price (willingness-to-pay wtp ) for











H is the habit ratio, and i
t is the satiation ratio which is a function of the
potential demand per worker xt = Xt
Lt . Therefore, if the overall worker fund Xt increases,
the fraction i
t required to satisfy at satiation a given want decreases. Note that the
willingness to pay ranges from wtp0 up to wtp when habits ranges from 0 up to i.
The relative demand curve i(p) depends on wtp and on the real wage to account for











t + (1   )i
Ht 1
Where  2 (0;1) captures the speed of habituation.
3.4. Price Setting and Distributive Shares. At the steady-state equilibrium, prices















In out-of-equilibrium transitional dynamics, to the contrary, the stable relationship
between technological and distributive parameters breaks. When innovation takes place,
pi
t decreases as a result of the productivity improvements which follow innovation. A
critical assumption of our model is that, in line with the endogenous growth theory
(Aghion and Howitt 1998), entrepreneurs earn temporary innovative rents that slow
down the process of price adjustment to the new competitive level. Here, rents are
required in order to provide the funds to invest in innovation. In particular, we suppose9
that only a fraction (1   ) of the gap between actual and competitive price is lled in
one period, hence:
(3.16) pi
t = (1   )pi
t + pi
t 1
As measure of the total rents that accrue to entrepreneurs during the transition process
with respect to the competitive benchmark, we use the sum in time of the relative gap




()i = =(1   )
We can interpret the parameter  as the outcome of the bargaining process between
entrepreneurs and workers over the innovative rents. Clearly, when  = 0,the lower
bound, the prices are always set at the competitive level, thus all the gains from inno-
vation accrue to workers.
3.5. Market outcomes. In our sequential model, exchange takes place at the end of
each period whereas prices change only at the junction between periods. In value terms,
the market outcome of sector i at time t is the minimum between the demand of workers






Whenever the two sides of the market do not exactly match, market disequilibrium
emerges. If these are negative, entrepreneurs accumulate undesired inventories oi
t. Also
the labour market can be characterized by disequilibria, hence either unemployment or
residual innovative funds can emerge.
After each market round, new funds are determined. The evolution of workers' funds
reads as:























3.6. Steady-state equilibrium. At equilibrium, demand excesses are null and, since
we focus on the emergence of a new sector, there is only good 1. We can assign arbitrary
values to wt and K1 that determine the scale of nominal and real variables (prices,
capital, investments). For the simulation analysis, we use the normalization Y0 = A1
0 =
K1
0 = 1. The preference parameters wp0 and wp are set according to the hypothesis
that, at the equilibrium prices, sector 2 is not present (2
H = 0) and sector 1 is at
the satiation point 1
H = 1. The initial equilibrium level of the fund is obtained by10
substituting 1








Notice that, in steady state, investments in innovation are null as all market oppor-
tunities are matched, hence the fund F0 is equal to the total wage fund needed to carry
on investments and current production.
We start from an equilibrium where only workers are endowed with idle funds, i.e.
2 < 1; and thus H0 > 04. All the other parameters matter only out of the steady-
state equilibrium. In next two sections, we are going to analyse the out-of-equilibrium
dynamics brought about by an exogenous preference shock and then we will check the
robustness of our ndings.
4. Structural Change and the Income Distribution
In this section, we present the main results obtained by means of numerical simula-
tions. We consider a preference shock that increases by 1% the wtp for the new good,
allowing, at the initial competitive price, the emergence of a small mass of demand for
the new good. By opening new opportunities in the market, this initial shock5 induces
the break of the existing steady-state that triggers consumers' learning and technolog-
ical improvements (see eq. 4). When shocked, our dynamical system displays dierent
behaviour with respect to the size of the distributive change . Three viable regions
and an unviable one can be identied.
4.1. Region 1: Classical Unemployment,  2 (0;). In absence of redistributive
changes in favour of the entrepreneurs, the emergence of the new sector mainly occurs
at the detriment of the old one. The initial investment shift from sector 1 to sector 2 is
the origin of further sectoral unbalances. In particular, both sectors experience excesses
of demand. In sector 1, demand remains unchanged while the productive capacity is
reduced, reecting the initial investment shift. In sector 2, the new capacity does not
match yet the new demand. These two excesses of demand provide the right signal for
investing in innovation, which can be sustained by the idle funds initially accumulated
due to the break in the sectoral co-ordination. The high eciency of innovative invest-
ments in the new sector, see eq. 4, conjures an over-shooting eect that turns out to
save too much labour. As a result, unemployment jumps permanently up in spite of the
net positive excess of demand in both sectors (gure 1).
This seems paradoxical, but it actually is not. Given the unfavourable distributive
conditions, investing in innovation does not pay back and eventually brings about a
net cut in entrepreneurs' funds. Independently of what happens to the demand side,
a permanent increase in unemployment is the consequence of a permanent lack of in-
vestments, which coincide with entrepreneurs' funds. These ndings remind us of the
4Following the discussion in section 2, recall that the existence of idle funds is needed only because
wants are hierarchically ranked. In the case of perfect substitution between good 1 and 2, one can easily
start with 
2 = 1.
5Results do not change in the case of an initial technological shock that reduces the price of the new
good below its wtp.11



































Figure 1. Classical Unemployment ( = :8)
classical avour of post-Keynesian models in which distributional changes in favour of
capitalists, the only class that invests, tend to increase the nal output of the economy.
Moreover, the level of unemployment rises if the new sector is more capital-intensive








t , so that structural change is associated to
capital deepening. Indeed, the higher investment costs further reduce the net capital
formation and exacerbate the supply constraint. Finally, the sectoral composition of
output is sub-optimal from the consumer point of view in so far as good 1 has a higher
priority than good 2. This is a consequence of the fact that consumers are `too rich',
thereby they keep demanding in excess both the old and the new good, leaving the
investments' ratio stable.
Similar patterns characterize the system until threshold , dened as the pseudo-
equilibrium where unemployment is almost reabsorbed (0.5%) but excesses of demand
are not. Moving from 0 to , the nal output in sector 1 remains unchanged whereas the
one in sector 2 slowly expands together with employment. The larger the entrepreneurs'
fund is, the more it allows to aord investments in physical capital, matching the demand
gap. However, entrepreneurs' funds are only sucient to carry on normal investments,
not to sustain more innovation investments than the initial ones; thereby, the productive
capacity does not fully adapt to the new demand conditions and supply factors restrain
growth.
4.2. Region 2: Full-Employment Equilibria,  2 (;). Along every part of
region 2 but the equilibrium level, each nal outcome represents a pseudo-equilibrium
as long as excesses of demand persist. In particular, any variations in the distribution of
innovative rents in favour of entrepreneurs improve the performance of the system as the12
funds used for technological improvements augment. The intuition is straightforward:
 should increase in order to relax entrepreneurs' nancial constraint, which is strongly
connected to the additional innovation costs required to remove the supply constraint.
For any  lower than , the temporary entrepreneurial rents are not large enough to
assure, through innovation investments, the appropriate supply adjustment so that the
nal output is not maximized.
Looking at the funds' dynamics (gure 2), the increase of entrepreneurs' funds fuels
a wave of incremental innovations that is larger the higher the distributive change. The
dynamic interaction of the two funds mirrors the one of two competing species (Goodwin
1967). During the transition phase, the system is characterized by turbulent behaviour
and by the reciprocal stealing of funds' quota. In the nal state-of-rest, a new ecology
is restored only if funds return back to their natural level, which is the initial one.
In spite of the fact that, throughout region 2, a sort of stability is displayed (whereas
in region 1 unemployment can be a source of political instability), only in  disequilib-
ria are reabsorbed both in the labour and in the two nal markets. The new equilibrium
is also characterized by a substantial habit change. Consistently with the historical
experience (Houthakker 1987), economic growth is accompanied by a decrease in the
propensity to consume the basic good compensated by an increase in the propensity
to consume non-basic goods. Moreover, in , the appropriate co-ordination of con-
sumers' learning and innovation investments reset all the sectoral unbalances to zero.
Of particular interest is the fact that the initial disequilibrium triggers sectoral unbal-
ances that continuously generate new opportunities for prots (Hirshman 1958). These
inter-sectoral spillover emerge only out-of-equilibrium as a signal that provides the in-
centives to dampen the emerging labour constraints, hence ensuring the modernization
of the economy through the coordination between the expansion of the new sector and
technological improvements in the old one.
4.3. Region 3: Keynesian Unemployment,  2 (;). In correspondence of 
above the optimum, it is demand that tends to restrain growth. For values of  up to
+
max, the excessive unbalance in favour of entrepreneurs does not translate into output
reductions but has only a negative impact on employment (gure 3). Lower employment
levels are here magnied by over-investments in innovation which reduce the requirement
of labour per unit of output, pushing productivity up. This conjures a trade-o between
output maximization, which tends to be reached for level of inequality above the optimal
one, and full-employment, which is warranted also for distributions more in favour of
workers. As expected, fund dynamics reect an unbalanced co-evolution of demand and
supply factors, leaving entrepreneurs with idle funds. Also habits reect these unbalances
in so far as the nal propensity to consume is higher than in the sub-region [ 
max;].
Two implications of this increase in the propensity to consume deserve to be mentioned.
On the one hand, a smaller workers' fund level reduces the system's capacity to adapt
to external demand or supply shocks. On the other hand, the joint increase of income
inequality and of the propensity to consume reconciles the theory with what occurred
in last decades, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries (Oecd 2008).
In this `Keynesian region', the neo-classical argument supporting a negative relation-
ship between real wages and employment level is confuted in so far as distributional13





































Figure 2. Full-Employment ( = 2:9)
changes above a certain level turn out to harm the consumption of workers and, there-
fore, employment via aggregate demand. Indeed, in the sub-region [+
max; ], the nal
output begins to decrease below its potential level, while unemployment becomes con-
siderable. However, as will be clearer in the robustness analysis, this sub-region exists
only if the adjustment of investments to market disequilibria is sticky, i.e.  small, being
constrained by, for instance, a strict product market regulation. Otherwise, in systems
characterized by pro-active investment behaviour such as Anglo-Saxon ones, the sub-
region of high unemployment does not emerge and the system suddenly transitions from
the upper output-maximizing region [;+
max] to the unviable region, so +
max = .
The next sub-section discusses this case in details.
4.4. Unviable Region. A change in the distributional rule that is too favourable to
entrepreneurs eventually brings about slumps due to a lack of demand. In this case, a
successful learning process is not sucient to enable the modernization of the economy
since, in the long run, the workers' idle funds are not able to sustain the demand for the
new product. More interestingly, the lack of nal demand might be a long-run outcome
(gure 4). In the initial phase, we observe a fast growth based on high investments both
in new capital goods and in innovations. The associated expansion of the productive
capacity allows workers to nd the new goods in shops, thereby accelerating learning.
This apparently fast transition collapses when the absolute increase in the propensity
to consume completely squeezes the workers' idle funds{hence, the system experiences a
crisis. This theoretical counter-example sheds new light on the structural origins of the
contemporary nancial crisis. As will be shown in next section, the sudden, non-smooth14



































Figure 3. Keynesian Unemployment ( = 4:8)



































Figure 4. Long-Run Crisis ( = 6)
emergence of a slump, brought about by a distributional change too much in favour15
of entrepreneurs (or skilled workers), tends to occur especially in systems with highly
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Figure 5. Long-run output and unemployment for dierent values of 
4.5. Summary. Our results can be conveniently summarized in two curves that re-
spectively depict the nal level of aggregate output and of unemployment as  varies.
The rst curve shows that the value of inequality that maximizes output is internal;
the second identies an U-shaped (non-linear) relationship between unemployment and
changes in inequality. The latter is of particular interest in so far as wage moderation
is normally supposed to foster investment and therefore employment. In our model, the
employment-enhancing eect of higher inequality occurs only for moderate distributive
changes. Large distributive changes, instead, impose a (Keynesian) bound to demand
that might generate a long-run crisis, i.e. unviability. Finally, in the full employment
region, there exists only a single optimum such that output is maximized and excesses
of demand are reabsorbed.
5. Robustness
In this section we check whether our results are robust to variations in the values of
the out-of-equilibrium parameters (;; ;;). We extract 1500 random samples of all
these parameters in their whole range (0;1). For each sample, we simulate the system
dynamics for dierent values of the distributional parameter  in the relevant range
(0:5;9:5). Thereafter, we check the region to which the long run outcome belongs to.
To quantify the size of the dierent regions, in gure 6 we show the relative frequency
of each region, in correspondence of dierent values of 6. As  increases, the to regions
tend to appear from the rst (classical unemployment) up to the latest (unviable region)
and then gradually tend to disappear in the same order for higher values. In particular,
long-run crises occur only for  > 2:5. This implies that, moving to higher values of ,
the average thresholds that separate the regions shift to the right. At the same time, the
quota of the two full-employment regions decreases whereas the frequency of the unviable
cases increases over the 50% when inequality becomes relatively high. For extreme values
of the distributive change extreme regions prevail (classical unemployment and long-run
6We dene equilibrium when the excess of demand are lower than 0.5% both in the labour and in the
nal markets.16
       
        
            
                              
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                                              
                                                           
Figure 6. Frequencies of the regions
crisis, respectively). In correspondence of moderate distributive changes, more than one
quarter of the cases belong to the full employment regions, but no region tends to prevail
and, therefore, the remaining parameters become decisive in determining the outcome
of the transition. Finally, the equilibrium region becomes thinner the larger the value of
the distributive parameter.
Overall, this robustness exercise strongly conrms the non-linear, U-shaped relation-
ships that we found in the previous section. On the one extreme, whatever the set
of parameters, low investors' rents are not compatible with the targets of labour and
nal market equilibrium. On the other extreme, when innovative rents are mainly ap-
propriated by investors, the unviable region tends to become the dominant one. Not
surprisingly, the size of the classical unemployment region decreases as  increases al-
most disappearing when the supply constraint is removed. Of particular interest is the
behaviour of the Keynesian region whose size is large only for few intermediate values
of , whereas for high values the system suddenly transitions from equilibrium to crisis.
This eect sheds light on the asymmetric behaviour played in our model by demand
and supply constraints. While a lack of adaptation on the supply-side forces the sys-
tem in a stable state-of-rest, demand shortages often lead to unviability as long as the
dynamic of workers' funds is implicitly driven by consumers' habituation that becomes
very sticky at satiation levels7. As a result, when the distribution is too much in favour
of entrepreneurs, worker's demand exceeds their income and hence funds are quickly
decumulated. It is worthy to notice that, in the literature on consumption (Ando and
Modigliani 1963), downward stickiness of habits has been used to justify empirical regu-
larities of the income-consumption relationship such as the existence of an autonomous
component of consumption.
Although the interactions of the dierent parameters have strong eects on the sepa-
rating thresholds, each single parameter, but   and , has only a minor role8. In order
to show how results change for   and , we plot the curves of long-run quantities and
7As long as habituation takes time, asymmtery is only slighly reduced if workers takes into account,
in their consumption decisions, of the decrease in their funds.
8Indeed, the parameters of consumers' learning and of the adapatation of the expectations to novelties
mainly aect the speed of transition, being the transition faster for large values of these parameters.17















































Figure 7. Long-run total output and unemployment curves for dierent
values of  
In gure 7 and 8, we see that for very low values of  , the innovation investments
are not enough productive to overcome the resource constraint, thereby the nal level of
output never reaches its maximum. In this case, increasing investors' rents only leads to a
long run crisis. Moving to higher values of  , all the regions begin to emerge but the range
of the viable ones become thinner up to disappearing. Moreover, when investments in
innovation are too productive the full employment region disappears and the transition,
if viable, will ever nish with a positive rate unemployment (large technological over-
shooting). Overall,   has a large eect upon the outcomes of the transition as long as it
aects the size of the innovative rents{i.e. innovation is more productive{and therefore
magnies the distributive eects described throughout the paper.
The variation of  has a signicant impact only for low values. In this case both
the threshold of the unviable region and those internal to the viable one shift to the
right. The former eect occurs because, as typical in the out-of-equilibrium literature
(AG 1998), slow adjustments of agents' behaviour to disequilibria increase the system
viability. To explain the latter eect note that, when investments become less sensitive
to market signals, larger rents are needed to nance innovation. At the same time, since
a lower sensitivity to disequilibria makes more dicult to deal with market and sectoral
unbalances, the size of the full employment regions tends to decrease.
6. Conclusions
This paper constructs a post-Keynesian disequilibrium model in order to analyse the
structural transition characterized by the emergence of a new sector that satises a want
lower in the hierarchical scale. We show that, in an economy where preferences and
technology adapt over time, multiple outcomes are mainly brought about by dierent
distributive rules governing the assignment of innovative rents between workers and
entrepreneurs. Both output maximization and full employment are reached in an internal
region of the distributive change; however, there exists a unique internal value of the
distributive change that is compatible both with the equilibrium in all markets and with
the saturation of both wants. Above the upper bound of this internal range, since real












































Figure 8. Long-run total output and unemployment curves for dierent
values of 
nal demand to satisfy the expansion in the possibilities of production. As a result,
Keynesian unemployment or long-run slumps emerge depending on how fast investment
and innovation react to disequilibria. In contrast, below the lower bound of the full
employment region, entrepreneurs' resources to invest in innovations dry up before the
system has successfully expanded its productive capacity.
The relationship between distributive changes and the nal outcomes in terms of
output and employment can be seen as a generalization of the Predator-Prey ecology
(Goodwin 1967) leading to a continuum of results. This generalization enriches post-
Keynesian results in two directions. On the one hand, we are able to robustly generate
states-of-rest characterized either by classical or by Keynesian unemployment, casting
serious doubts on the negative relationship between real wages and employment. On
the other hand, the model provides an original glance on the relationship between long
and short-run in so far as the co-evolution of demand and supply factors turns out
to aect long-run steady states. In particular, we show that there exist cases where a
shortage of nal demand{due to a redistribution too favourable to the high class{ends up
having long-run consequences. This suggests a careful reconsideration in growth theory
of the long-run eects of the distribution of income through the composition of the nal
demand.
Finally, we introduce a new framework for analysing the relationship between struc-
tural change and income inequality that can be easily extended, for instance, to the
analysis of the green industrial revolution, characterized by a large share of need-based
or demand-driven innovations. In future and on-going works (Vona and Patriarca 2009),
our aim is to extend the model to assess whether our results change considering work-
ers' heterogeneity in factor endowments. The investigation of workers' heterogeneity
will allow to disentangle the ways in which the functional and the structural sources of
inequality interact.
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